

Message Text

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SUBJECT: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS

TTBT/PNE MESSAGE NUMBER THIRTY NINE

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. FOLLOWING PLENARY MARCH 11, AMBASSADOR STOESSEL, ACCOMPANIED BY BUCHHEIM AND IFFT MET WITH MOROKHOV, TIMERBAEV AND SAFRONOV PLUS INTERPRETERS IN SMALL GROUPS MEETING. FOLLOWING UP ON CORRIDOR CONVERSATION OF MARCH 10, STOESSEL SAID HE UNDERSTOOD SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO ADDRESS FISSION YIELD LIMIT IN PLENARY BUT SAID US DOES NOT WANT THE MATTER UNEXAMINED. HE ALSO STRESSED NEED FOR SOVIETS TO ADDRESS VERIFICATION. MOROKHOV SAID FISSION YIELD LIMIT IS SOUND FROM TECHNICAL VIEWPOINT, BUT SAID HE WAS CONCERNED THAT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM SAMPLES MIGHT PASS INTO HANDS OF THIRD COUNTRIES. HE ALSO EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT PHOTOGRAPHY ON SITE COULD BE PERMITTED AND REFERRED TO NTS REGULATION IN THIS REGARD. MOROKHOV AGREED THAT IF SIMULTANEOUS CONTAINED SHOTS IN GROUP CANNOT BE INDIVIDUALLY DISTINGUISHED, THE SOVIETS' PROPOSED 150 KT LIMIT WOULD APPLY TO AGGREGATE YIELD. HOWEVER, SOVIET METHOD, WHICH IS WELL KNOWN TO US EXPERTS, WILL PERMIT SUCH DISTINCTIONS TO BE MADE IN MOST CASES. THESE VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES ARE RELATED TO OBERVERS - A SUBJECT THE SOVIET SIDE IS NOT READY TO DISCUSS. END SUMMARY.

2. AT US SUGGESTION, AMBASSADOR STOESSEL, ACCOMPANIED BY BUCHHEIM AND IFFT, MET WITH MOROKHOV, TIMERBAEV AND SAFRONOV PLUS INTER-SECRET

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PRETERS FOLLOWING MATCH 11 PLENARY. STOESSEL OPENED BY REFERRING

TO CORRIDOR CONVERSATION OF MARCH 10 (REPORTED IN PNE MESSAGE 33), WHICH HAD RAISED IMPORTANT POINTS DESERVING OF MORE CAREFUL EXAMINATION. CENTRAL SUBJECT OF THIS CONVERSATION WAS US PROPOSAL THAT FISSION YIELD OF EXCAVATION EXPLOSIVES BE LIMITED TO 0.2 KT. STOESSEL RECALLED THAT TIMERVAEV HAD RAISED QUESTION OF SETTING BEFORE THIRD COUNTRIES TECHNOLOGICAL PARAMETER THAT MIGHT BE CONSTRUED AS BASIS FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN PNE DEVICES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND MOROKHOV HAD SUGGESTED COLLECTION OF SAMPLES TO VERIFY FISSION YIELD LIMIT MIGHT PRESENT PROBLEM BECAUSE IT WOULD INVOLVE ACCESS TO CERTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT EXPLOSIVES DESIGN.

3. STOESSEL SAID US UNDERSTOOD SOVIET DESIRE TO REFRAIN FROM DISCUSSING SUCH MATTERS IN PLENARY, BUT DID NOT WISH TO LEAVE THEM UNEXAMINED. US DEVOTED GREAT DEAL OF EFFORT TO SEARCH FOR SYSTEM OF LIMITATION THAT COULD RATIONALIZE CONDUCT OF EXCAVATION PNES WITH ESSENTIAL TERMS OF TREATY OF JULY 1974. FISSION YIELD LIMIT IS VITAL CPMONENT OF THAT SYSTEM AND ITS RELIABLE VERIFICATION CORRESPONDINGLY IMPORTANT. FOLLOWING UP PLENARY DISCUSSION, STOESSEL THEN STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF QUESTION OF DISTINGUISHING AND DETERMINING YIELD OF INDIVIDUAL CONTAINED SHOTS DETONATED SIMULTANEOUSLY IN GROUPS.

4. IN ENSUING DISCUSSION, AFTER STATING THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE AN EQUAL INTEREST IN ACHIEVING A PNE AGREEMENT, MOROKHOV MADE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR POINTS:

(A) SOVIET SIDE HAS STARTED DISCUSSIONS WITH VERY IMPORTANT QUESTION OF YIELDS OF CONTAINED AND EXCAVATION PNES. SOVIETS CAN- NOT MAKE PNE PROGRAM DEPENDENT ON "SOME CONTINGENCIES."
(B) YIELD LIMITATION NUMBERS PROPPSED BY SOVIET SIDE ARE MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE WITH THEM, AND REPRESENT CONSIDERABLE REDUCTIONS TO COME NEARER US POSITION. EXCAVATION YIELDS LIMTIS COULD "FLUCTUATE A LITTLE." TIMERBAEV ADDED "BUT NOT MUCH."
(C) SOVIET SIDE WILL BE READY TO DISCUSS VERIFICATION AFTER LEARNING WHETHER SOVIET PROPOSALS ON YIELDS ARE ACCEPTABLE. US RESPONSE COULD BE IN THE FORM OF SAYIG THAT SOVIET NUMBERS ARE ACCEPTABLE PROVIDED THAT SATISFACTORY VERIFICATION PROCEDURES ARE WORKED OUT.
(D) HE WOULD LIKE T BE ABLE TO TELL HIS GOVERNMENT THAT US WILL ACCEPT CERTAIN PROVISIONS IF USSR WILL ACCEPT CERTAIN OTHER PROVIDIONS. THUS FAR, HE WAS DEPRIVED OF A BASIS FOR APPROACHING

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HIS AUTHORITIES IN THIS MANNER.

(E) US PROPOSAL ON FISSION YIELD LIMIT IS SOUND FROM TECHNICAL VIEWPOINT AND HE DID NOT SEE ANYTHING UNACCEPTABLE IN IT, BUT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ALSO COME INTO PLAY. COULD IT BE ASSURED THAT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM SAMPLES WOULD NOT PASS INTO HANDS OF THIRD COUNTRIES? HE COULD VOUCH FOR SOVIET ABILITY IN THIS REGARD BUT NOT US ABILITY. AS ILLUSTRATION, HE MENTIONED HERALD TRIBUNE ARTICLE WHICH HAD REVEALED TO ENTIRE WORLD THE

COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

(F) HE WAS NOT SURE PHOTOGRAPHY AT SITES COULD BE ALLOWED. HE RECALLED THAT, DURING VISIT TO NTS, HIS CAMERA HAD BEEN TAKEN AWAY, ALTHOUGH HE WAS PERMITTED TO PHOTOGRAPH RULISON. PHOTOS TAKEN BY US SIDE OF HIS VISIT TO BUGGY WERE PROVIDED LATER. SOVIET SIDE IS SIMILARLY PREPARED TO PROVIDE PHOTOS AFTER EVENT. LIKewise HE HAD BEEN REFUSED PERMISSiIN TO COLLECT ROCKS AT NTS. SAMPLES HAD BEEN PROMISED BY US BUT WERE NEVER PROVIDED. HE ADDED HE CONSIDERED THESE PROCEDURES AT NTS REGARDING PHOTOGRAPHY AND SAMPLES FULLY JUSITIFIED.

(G) QUESTIONS FO VERIFICATON WOULD BE "IMMEASURABLY EASIER" FOR THE SOVIET SIDE TO DISCUSS IN A FRAME WORK OF COOPERATION.

5. STOESSEL DEFENDED US PROPOSALS IN SOME ETAIL. HE AGAIN STRESSED IMPORANCE OF VERIFICATION AND NOTED IT COULD NOT BE SEPARATED FROM YIELD LIMITATINS. HE NOTED PROGRESS ON LIMITATIONS ON CONTAINED SHOTS AND REITERATED NEED FOR SOVIETS TO ADDRESS VERIFICATION METHODS FOR THESE.

6. MOROKHOV REPLIED THAT SIDE CARRYING OUT PNE MUST PROVIDE VERIFICATION PERMITTING THE OTHER SIDE TO DISTINGUISH INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS IN GROUP. IF THESE COULD NOT BE DISTINGUISHED, THE 150 KT LIMIT WOULD APPLY TO THE AGGREGATE YELD. IF AGREGATE YIELD IN SUCH CASE EXCEEDED 150 KT, THIS WOULD CONSITITUTE A VIOLATION. HOWEVER, IF INDIVIDUAL SHOTS COULD BE DISTINGUISHED, 150 KT LIMIT WOULD APPLY ONLY TO INDIVIDUAL SHOTS. IF US AGREES, SIDES COULD PUT THIS PREMISE ON PAPER AND MOVE FORWARD.

7. IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DETAILS, MOROKHOV SAID HIS INSTRUCTIONS DO NOT PERMIT SUCH DISCUSSION. METHOD HE HAS IN MIND IS WELL KNOWN TO US EXPERTS. IT DOES NOT INVOLVE TECHNICAL MEANS IN US BUT "CLOSER." AS FAR AS RIO BLANCO TYPE PNE IS CONCERNED, SOVIETS ARE NOT GOING TO CARRY OUT SUCH SHOTS, OR
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IF THEY DO, AGGREGATE YIELD WILL BE UNDER 150 KT. EVEN IN CASE OF RIO BLANCO, HOWEVER, HOROKHOV SAID SAFRONOV HAD TOLD HIM SHOTS COULD BE DISTINGUISHED IF INSTRUMENTS WERE PLACED IN PROPER POSITIONS. HE CLOSED BY NOTING THAT THESE TECHNIQUES ARE RELATED TO OBSERVERS - A SUBJECT THE SOVIET SIDE IS NOT READY TO DISCUSS.

8. STOESSEL STATED THAT US WILL RE-EXAMINE SUCH AN APPROACH TO IDENTIFICATION AND MEASUREMENT OF INDIVIDUAL YIELDS IN A SIMUL-TANEOUS GROUP SHOT; BUT THAT US SIDE AT PRESENT DOES NOT SEE HOW MEASUREMENT OF SUCH INDIVIDUAL YIELDS CAN BE DONE.
STOESSEL

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